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Australasian Society of Legal 
Philosophy Annual Conference
6 - 8 July, 2018
Bond University, Gold Coast
DAY ONE - FRIDAY, 6 JULY
Time Activity Room
2pm - 4pm POSTGRADUATE WORKSHOP
What is Legal Instrumentalism?
Sina Akbari (LSE)
On the Backs of Migrant Workers – Imported Labour in the Australian 
Agriculture Sector
Sayomi Ariyawansa (Melbourne)
The Legal Thought of Roberto Unger
Julian Ligertwood (Victoria)
Are All Human Rights Conceptually the Same, or Can They be Distinguished? 
William Phillips (Melbourne) 
Building 4, Level 2, 
Rooms 29 and 31
4.30pm - 5pm Arrival and Registration Foyer outside Building 4, Level 3, 
Room 41
5pm - 6pm Opening Keynote
John Gardner (Oxford): Public Interest and Public Policy in Private Law
Building 4, Level 3, Room 41
6pm - 6.45pm Opening Reception Building 4, Level 2, Student Lounge
7pm - 9pm Conference Dinner Building 6, Level 3, University Club
DAY TWO - SATURDAY, 7 JULY
Time Activity Room
9am - 9.30am Arrival and Registration Foyer outside Building 4, 
Level 3, Room 37
9.30am - 11am Parallel Sessions
SESSION A
Reasoning with Authoritative Directives
Dale Smith (Melbourne)
The Inefficiency Gap – Epistemic Limits of Judicial Authority 
Mrinal Singh (Dartmouth) 
Epistemic Peers and Epistemic Disagreement in the Context of Jurisprudence
Christian Ponce (UNSW)
SESSION B
Procedural Justice, Relational Theory and Alternative Dispute Resolution
Therese MacDermott and Denise Meyerson (Macquarie) 
A Theory of Contributive Justice
Kimberly Chuang (Michigan) 
The Rawlsian Notion of Collective Self-Determination: A Reconstruction
Jayani Nadarajalingam (Monash)
SESSION C
The Victorian Voluntary Assisted Dying Act 2017: Some Questions
David Wood (Melbourne)
Judicial Adherence to the ‘Minimum Core Obligation’ of the Right to Health in 
Bangladesh: A Critical Review
SMT Karim (Macquarie)
Human Rights and Everyday Justice: Harmony in the Mirror 
Florentina Benga (Bond) 
Building 4, Level 1, Room 22
Building 4, Level 2, Rooms 
29 and 31
Building 4, Level 3, Room 37
11am - 11.30am Morning Tea Area Outside Building 4b, 
Level 1, Psychology Clinic
11.30am - 1pm  Parallel Sessions
SESSION A: NATURAL LAW STREAM
Natural Law in Reformed Christianity: Historical Developments and Contemporary 
Contributions
David VanDrunen (Westminster Seminary California)
The Spark that Still Shines: John Calvin on Conscience and Human Depravity
Constance Youngwon Lee (UQ) 
Natural Law and Federalism
Nicholas Aroney (UQ)
SESSION B
Informal Constitutionalism and the Role of Politics
James Allan (UQ)
The Rule of Law Without the Concept of Law 
Hillary Nye (LSE / Alberta)
Political Constitutionalism: Legal Forms and Liberal Norms
Edward Willis (Auckland)  
SESSION C
What is the Philosophy of Law for a Naturalist? 
Dan Priel (Osgoode Hall)  
Clarifying the Task of Linguistic Political Philosophy
Lukas Opacic (Sydney) 
Interesting Things To Do With a Dead Grundnorm (Through a Leap Without Faith)
Iain Stewart (Macquarie) 
Building 4, Level 1, Room 22
Building 4, Level 2, Rooms 
29 and 31
Building 4, Level 3, Room 37
1pm - 2pm Lunch Area Outside Building 4b, 
Level 1, Psychology Clinic
2pm - 3pm Keynote Session
Nicole Roughan (Auckland): The Role of Recognition
Building 4, Level 3, Room 37
3pm - 3.30pm Afternoon Tea Area Outside Building 4b, 
Level 1, Psychology Clinic
3.30pm - 5pm Parallel Sessions
SESSION A: NATURAL LAW STREAM
Intelligibility, Practical Reason and the Common Good
Jonathan Crowe (Bond)
Understanding Law as a MacIntyrean ‘Practice’
Andrew Curtin (UQ)
The Philosophy of Proportionality
Mikayla Brier-Mills (Bond)
SESSION B
The Future of the Nature of Law: A Post-Human Perspective
Gunoo Kim (Gwangju) 
Rules, Perception and Emotion: When Do Institutions Determine Behaviour? 
Brendan Markey-Towler (UQ)
Citizenship by Investment and the Citizen of Tomorrow
Michael Krakat (Bond)
SESSION C
The Argument from Consent for a Moral Obligation to Obey the Law 
Kevin Walton (Sydney)
Hypocrisy, Inconsistency, and the Moral Standing of the State
Kyle Fritz (Mississippi) 
The Legal Chartism of Jan Patočka and Liu Xiaobo
Daniel Brennan (Bond)
Building 4, Level 1, Room 22
Building 4, Level 2, Rooms 
29 and 31
Building 4, Level 3, Room 37
5pm - 6pm Annual General Meeting Building 4, Level 3, Room 34
DAY THREE - SUNDAY, 8 JULY
Time Activity Room
9am - 
9.30am 
Arrival and Registration Foyer outside Building 4, 
Level 3, Room 41
9.30am - 
11am 
Parallel Sessions
SESSION A
Ecological Vulnerability and the Devolution of Individual Autonomy
Katie Woolaston (Griffith)
*Winner of the ASLP Essay Prize*
How Do We Think About Lolita? Difference, Alterity and Animal Liberation
Zali Brookes (UQ) and Jonathan Crowe (Bond)
Luce Irigaray on Nature and Law
Catherine Carol (UQ)
SESSION B
The Place of Religion in Human Rights Law: Distinguishing Freedom of Religion from 
the Right against Religious Discrimination
Tarunabh Khaitan (Melbourne) and Jane Calderwood Norton (Auckland)
Religious Law and Legal Order: Conflict or Coexistence?
Kaisa Iso-Herttua (Helsinki) 
Equal Voice Liberalism and Free Public Religion: Some Legal Implications 
Alex Deagon (QUT)
SESSION C
Privileges and Justifications
Rob Mullins (UQ)
Law as Promises
Angelo Ryu (Michigan)
Who is the Face of a Business? 
Matthew Lister (Deakin)
Building 4, Level 2, Rooms 29 
and 31
Building 4, Level 3, Room 37
Building 4, Level 3, Room 41
11am - 11.30am Morning Tea Area Outside Building 4b, 
Level 1, Psychology Clinic
11.30am - 
1pm  
Keynote Session
Book Symposium: Margaret Davies, Law Unlimited (Routledge, 2017)
Commentators: Ben Golder (UNSW), Honni van Rijswijk (UTS) and William MacNeil (SCU) Building 4, Level 3, Room 41
1pm - 2pm Lunch and farewell Area Outside Building 4b, 
Level 1, Psychology Clinic
WHAT IS LEGAL INSTRUMENTALISM?
Sina Akbari (LSE)
The terms instrumentalism, consequentialism, utilitarianism and welfare 
economics are often used interchangeably in the private law theory 
literature. In this paper I provide a close examination of the formal structure 
of instrumentalist theories of the law and what they entail. I show that, by 
accepting instrumentalist justifications of the law, one is committed only to 
two ideas. First, that a legal practice is justified only insofar as it produces 
morally valuable social effects. Second, that one requires an empirically-
grounded method to show how the legal practice produces those social 
effects. Beyond these two commitments, the formal structure of an 
instrumentalist justification of private law can accommodate a range of 
normative positions, including non-consequentialism about morality.
INFORMAL CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE ROLE OF POLITICS
James Allan (UQ)
This paper considers how best to understand the notion of informal 
constitutionalism.  It starts by looking at the notion of constitutionalism 
more generally, then compares the formal and informal varieties.  It finishes 
by discussing the role of politics in constitutionalism.  Along the way various 
common law countries are slotted into different categories.
ON THE BACKS OF MIGRANT WORKERS – IMPORTED LABOUR IN 
THE AUSTRALIAN AGRICULTURE SECTOR 
Sayomi Ariyawansa (Melbourne)
Building upon the notion that the protective function of labour law is its 
theoretical basis, this paper posits that the proper scope of labour law 
as a discipline includes acknowledging the state’s role in determining the 
composition of its labour force through immigration policy. The persistent 
mistreatment of temporary migrant workers in the Australian agriculture 
sector provides a focal case for examining this intersection between 
immigration policy and labour law. In surveying the historical development 
of labour migration pathways to Australia, purposed towards ‘nation-
building’ and the creation of the ideal labour market, this paper develops a 
concept of state responsibility for these temporary migrant workers that is 
grounded in the state’s bare instrumental use of their labour contribution. 
 
NATURAL LAW AND FEDERALISM
Nicholas Aroney (UQ)
This paper explores the contested relationship between natural law theory 
and federal theory. It is argued that while there are differences between 
the political implications of classic natural law and modern federalism, the 
differences are not nearly so great as some have supposed. Federalism is 
an outworking of a conception of the human person and human sociality 
that owes a great to deal to natural law theory and political practices that 
reach deeply into the middle ages. This paper seeks to spell out the nature 
of those conceptions, theories and practices. 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND EVERYDAY JUSTICE: HARMONY IN THE 
MIRROR
Florentina Benga (Bond)
This paper argues that as the concept of law should mirror the notions of 
culture, values and self, so human rights must be reflected in ‘everyday 
justice’ and not simply in the formal law of the state if they are to be 
meaningful. It does so by drawing on philosophical discussions on natural 
law with reference to the concept of law as examined by the community as 
a whole, on the one hand, and legal professionals, on the other hand. The 
paper specifically refers to the right to education and the right to justice 
from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, three levels of justice 
(formal, informal and everyday), and their association with traditional and 
contemporary legal education.
THE LEGAL CHARTISM OF JAN PATOČKA AND LIU XIAOBO
Daniel Brennan (Bond)
The paper explores and compares the unique application of chartism 
contained in the work of Jan Patočka and Liu Xiaobo. Patočka and Liu, 
through their respective involvements in Charter 77 and Charter 08, 
employed a chartist dissident tactic of exposing social injustice through 
charter movements; however, rather than calling for legislative change, 
their respective charter movements demand that existing laws be 
respected (which the respective Czechoslovakian and Chinese governments 
were not contemporaneously respecting). The paper explores the specific 
dissident philosophy at the heart of this appeal to legality as a form of 
dissent. 
THE PHILOSOPHY OF PROPORTIONALITY
Mikayla Brier-Mills (Bond)
This paper considers the philosophy of proportionality.  The author embarks 
on the question of whether ‘proportionality’ is evidence of morality in 
the law and thus a positivist attempt to introduce a natural law concept 
to the law. In so doing, the article de-constructs how the principle of 
proportionality has been constructed in the courts of Germany, Switzerland, 
Canada, the United Kingdom and Australia, proving that the uniform nature 
of the principle is due to its moral foundations. The author ultimately 
concludes that proportionality is an attempt to objectify morality so that 
moral judgments can be rendered by all courts, in the least subjective way 
possible, in spite of location. 
HOW DO WE THINK ABOUT LOLITA? DIFFERENCE, ALTERITY AND 
ANIMAL LIBERATION
Zali Brookes (UQ) and Jonathan Crowe (Bond)
This paper outlines an approach to animal ethics informed by the writings 
of Luce Irigaray and Emmanuel Levinas. This approach is developed 
through a contrast with Peter Singer’s well known theory of animal 
liberation. The two perspectives are explored through the prism of the 
ethical issue of animal captivity—in particular, the life of a captive orca 
named Lolita. Singer’s theory extends ethical consideration to non-human 
animals to the extent that their interests are analogous to those of humans. 
We argue, by contrast, for an approach that emphasises the irreducible 
difference and otherness of non-human animals as the foundation of their 
ethical status. The case of Lolita, in particular, illustrates the capacity for 
individual animals to unsettle our self-centred ethical outlook and make 
claims on us by virtue of their alterity.
LUCE IRIGARAY ON NATURE AND LAW
Catherine Carol (UQ)
The idea that human society is a victory over natural immediacy is a 
salient feature of modern law. Philosopher Luce Irigaray along with other 
contemporary thinkers argue the generative logic of nature is erased 
through superimposing a rational order which reflects the abstractions and 
values of an historically masculine embodiment and thinking. This paper 
will situate Irigaray’s philosophy on sexual difference within the natural law 
tradition. To do this, I focus on her contention that sexual laws, based on 
human nature being sexually differentiated, serve in part to remedy the 
elision of feminine thinking which in turn provides a critical standard to 
evaluate dualistic thinking encased in Western law. 
A THEORY OF CONTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
Kimberly Chuang (Michigan)
For a number of legal and political theorists (Liam Murphy, Thomas 
Nagel, Richard Epstein, and Gerald Gaus among them), the fair allocation 
of individual tax liabilities has been principally a matter of distributive 
justice. The fairness of tax schemes, for these theorists, is subsumed to 
the question of distributive justice: fairly allocated tax liabilities are just 
those that are compatible with the preferred theory of distributive justice. 
I propose a distinction here between principles of distributive justice that 
specify what is owed to people (which includes a division of the social 
surplus), and principles of contributive justice, which tell us what it is that 
people owe. Even a comprehensive specification of distributive justice 
leaves indeterminate how the burdens of running a society should be 
allocated. I argue that one particular principle stands out as a candidate 
principle of contributive justice: a principle of contribution in accordance 
with ability. A principle of contribution grounded in ability, I show, is more 
closely allied with a view of society as a cooperative enterprise.
INTELLIGIBILITY, PRACTICAL REASON AND THE COMMON GOOD
Jonathan Crowe (Bond)
The new natural law theorists, such as Germain Grisez and John Finnis, 
argue that intentional human action is oriented towards a plurality of 
basic goods. These basic goods render human action intelligible. The 
intelligibility of an action is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for its 
reasonableness. What, then, does it mean for an action to be intelligible or 
unintelligible? This paper argues that actions are intelligible or unintelligible 
relative to a background context of social practices. A theory of the basic 
goods, then, is at least as much an interpretive theory of social practices 
as it is an ontological account of human nature. This understanding of 
intelligibility reveals an important connection between the basic goods 
and the common good. The common good, understood as the project of 
creating a social environment that offers a wide and generally accessible 
array of modes of human flourishing, not only facilitates pursuit of the basic 
goods, but makes the goods possible. It does this by creating a context 
within which judgments can be made about the intelligibility of intentional 
conduct.
UNDERSTANDING LAW AS A MACINTYREAN ‘PRACTICE’
Andrew Curtin (UQ)
MacIntyre describes modern positive law as being – like all modern culture 
– ineluctably tainted by liberal individualism such that a state’s particular 
laws, incapable of instantiating a non-existent consensus about the good, 
can never meet a natural law criterion of authoritativeness and so cannot 
foster virtue nor be transformed by its practitioners.  Using insights from 
Berman and Hayek, this paper will attempt to refine MacIntyre’s functionally 
positivist and implicitly jaundiced account to show the positive law as being 
capable of bearing a conception of the good.  This will allow the discipline of 
law to be understood as a MacIntyrean ‘practice’.
EQUAL VOICE LIBERALISM AND FREE PUBLIC RELIGION: SOME 
LEGAL IMPLICATIONS 
Alex Deagon (QUT)
This paper proposes some potential legal implications for free public 
religion in the context of ‘equal voice liberalism’.  Equal voice liberalism 
and its antecedent connections to priority for democracy are first 
outlined in conjunction with an analysis of free public religion.  The paper 
subsequently argues that equal voice liberalism is a framework conducive 
to facilitating free public religion while preserving equality.  In this context 
the paper attempts to give more analytical and evaluative precision to the 
commonplace ideas of freedom and equality in terms of proportionate, 
reasonable accommodation of difference.  Finally, the paper considers how 
such accommodation might inform laws which govern public religion in 
both associational and individual forms.
HYPOCRISY, INCONSISTENCY, AND THE MORAL STANDING OF THE 
STATE
Kyle Fritz (Mississippi)
Some have argued that states like the United States are hypocritical and 
so lack the moral standing to hold socially deprived offenders responsible 
for their crimes. I argue that the US lacks the standing not because it is 
hypocritical, but because it inconsistently holds its citizens responsible. This 
inconsistency undermines standing for the same reasons that hypocrisy 
undermines standing; instead of making an unfair exception of itself, the 
state makes an unfair exception of others. This means that the state lacks 
the standing to hold anyone responsible for a crime for which it holds 
citizens responsible inconsistently. Reforming the justice system to regain 
standing is vital.
PUBLIC INTEREST AND PUBLIC POLICY IN PRIVATE LAW
John Gardner (Oxford)
The paper explores, and defends, the idea that private law exists to serve 
the public interest. The main public interest that private law exists to 
serve is the public interest (an interest that we all share) in justice being 
justly administered. That may sound like a pleonasm, but it is not. Justice 
can also be unjustly administered. In focusing on the ideal of justice inter 
partes some writers on private law neglect the third party always present 
or looming in private law (namely, the court) and the extra injustices it 
may perpetrate even when correctly administering justice. Reflection on 
this problem opens the way to consideration of the role of public policy 
in justifying private law doctrines and decisions. Can the minimization 
of injustice be regarded as a public policy? Some ways of thinking about 
‘policy arguments’ in private law suggest that it cannot. The paper will 
argue that the principal contemporary doubts about the role of public 
policy in justifying private law doctrines and decisions are owed to grossly 
simplified views about what public policy is or includes. Public policy work 
is mistakenly thought to be a kind of bean counting from which private law 
needs to be kept safe. That private law needs to be kept safe from bean 
counting will not be doubted. But public policy in turn needs to be kept safe 
from bean counting for exactly the same reason, viz. that not everything 
worthy of political attention is a bean to be counted.
RELIGIOUS LAW AND LEGAL ORDER: CONFLICT OR COEXISTENCE?
Kaisa Iso-Herttua (Helsinki)
Minorities’ legal orders are not a new phenomenon in Europe. In the Middle 
Ages, the overlapping systems of law and legal norms coexisted in a 
system. Ever since John Locke argued for the separation between the state 
and church the European paradigm expected religious conviction to be 
expressed more or less privately. Ayelet Shachar has illuminated the risks 
when diversity is privatized. Minorities’ ‘split status’ in family law matters 
need to be recognized. The Minority Legal Orders in United Kingdom study 
by Maleiha Malik shows that the most vulnerable are the minorities inside 
the minority who are left without the power to protect themselves. 
 
JUDICIAL ADHERENCE TO THE ‘MINIMUM CORE OBLIGATION’ OF 
THE RIGHT TO HEALTH IN BANGLADESH: A CRITICAL REVIEW
SMT Karim (Macquarie)
The paper examines how a right to health, expressed as a ‘minimum 
core obligation’ under international law, can be advanced within the 
constitutional framework of Bangladesh. Reinforcing this right is important 
within the post-2015 Development Agenda under the UN SDGs. Drawing 
upon examples the success of other jurisdictions to develop minimum core 
obligations of a right to health, it is argued that courts have a key role 
to play in actively enforcing a right to health to benefit poor, vulnerable 
and marginalised people. This paper proposes that judicial adherence, 
through interpretation of domestic and international law, may legally 
and constitutionally become a best compliance mechanism to define and 
measure the ‘minimum core obligation’ of a right to health in Bangladesh.
THE PLACE OF RELIGION IN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: DISTINGUISHING 
FREEDOM OF RELIGION FROM THE RIGHT AGAINST RELIGIOUS 
DISCRIMINATION
Tarunabh Khaitan (Melbourne) and Jane Calderwood Norton (Auckland)
 This paper argues that, while they are often conflated, the right to freedom 
of religion and the right against religious discrimination are in fact distinct 
human rights. Religious freedom is best understood as protecting our 
interest in religious adherence (and non-adherence), understood from the 
committed perspective of the (non)adherent. The right against religious 
discrimination is best understood as protecting our non-committal interest 
in the unsaddled membership of our religious group. Thus understood, the 
two rights have distinct normative rationales. Key doctrinal implications 
follow for the respective scope of the two rights, whether they may 
be claimed against non-state actors, and their divergent assessment 
of religious establishment. These differences reveal a complex map of 
two overlapping, but conceptually distinct, human rights which are not 
necessarily breached simultaneously.
THE FUTURE OF THE NATURE OF LAW: A POST-HUMAN 
PERSPECTIVE
Gunoo Kim (Gwangju)
With the rise of the emerging technologies for ‘enhancing’ human beings, 
human beings are gaining more opportunities than ever before for 
becoming ‘better’ in varying respects−including their physical, cognitive, 
emotional, and even moral capacities. In a word, human beings are 
becoming ‘post-humans’, and the history of human beings is becoming that 
of post-humans. Given this dramatic change, what would the law be like 
in that era? Drawing upon imagination and analysis, I will discuss (i) how 
the post-humanization is supposed to change human nature, (ii) how this 
change, if any, is supposed to reshape the common foundation for positive 
and natural law as well as the way we understand them, and (iii) what the 
resulting reshaping implies for the nature of law−the perennial topic of 
legal philosophy. 
CITIZENSHIP BY INVESTMENT AND THE CITIZEN OF TOMORROW
Michael Krakat (Bond)
Recalling Nikolai Gogol’s ‘Dead Souls’, counting citizen-subjects where 
there are none, today’s market citizens prove ever elusive, but with a 
progressive, global claim. In a race to personhood, leveraging passports 
of the world, some inventive nations have struck a market deal between 
economic growth and globalizing their ‘own’ sovereignty. Beyond 
Potemkin’s proverbial ‘plasterboard villages’ of developers and real estate 
agents praising the value of citizenship, legal schemes of a commoditizing 
Citizenship by Investment hold bold promises for citizenship’s future. For 
now, however, these schemes challenge Georg Jellinek’s organization of 
statehood (territory, population, government) as well as Hans Kelsen’s 
account of citizenship as the ‘personal sphere of validity of the legal order’ 
in an irreversible bid to pluralizing a citizenship of tomorrow, unbound 
beyond time and territory. 
THE SPARK THAT STILL SHINES: JOHN CALVIN ON CONSCIENCE 
AND HUMAN DEPRAVITY
Constance Youngwon Lee (UQ)
John Calvin’s bleak doctrine of postlapsarian human reason has commonly 
overshadowed his statement that ‘some sparks still shine.’ This article 
proposes that Calvin’s account of ‘conscience,’ by conserving an illuminated 
space in human nature, makes entirely possible a formal doctrine of natural 
law. Calvin employs the mutual yet asymmetrical relationship between the 
knowledge of God and human reason to frame his anthropology. According 
to this, human reason was originally created to perfectly access knowledge 
of God, but after the Fall can only attain imperfect access. Within this 
broader framework, by adopting a dialectic of dual perspectives, Calvin 
maintains that, however fallen, human nature still partially reflects the 
imago Dei as first intended. As through a glass darkly, this divine image 
is reflected in human conscience endowing it with sufficient knowledge 
for moral discernment. Moreover, Calvin’s emphasis on ‘common grace’ 
in the preservation of this knowledge allows him to simultaneously 
maintain human moral accountability and inexcusability before God. In 
this way, Calvin’s account of conscience enables him to hold both apparent 
extremes in tension: the universal moral agency of human beings and the 
transcendence of norms they pursue.  
THE LEGAL THOUGHT OF ROBERTO UNGER 
Julian Ligertwood (Victoria)
In this paper I set out the basic argument of my PhD thesis on the legal 
thought of Roberto Unger which is in its final drafting stages. I argue that 
Unger’s legal thought is of contemporary significance both for its insightful 
account of contemporary styles of legal analysis and for its clear rationale 
for the hope of achieving radical reform in part through law. But while his 
critical jurisprudence is clear, coherent and persuasive, I argue that his 
normative jurisprudence remains problematic both in terms of developing it 
in practice and in terms of explaining how social theory can inform, or place 
restraints on the normative practice of institutional imagination.
WHO IS THE FACE OF A BUSINESS?
Matthew Lister (Deakin)
It seems reasonable to most observers to hold some employees to higher 
standards for their non-employment behavior.  When, for example, top 
managers or directors of a company are found to be engaged in highly 
unethical or illegal behavior, this is often seen to reflect poorly on the 
company and be grounds for dismissal or reprimand.  However, with the rise 
of social media, the ability to connect the ‘bad acts’ of individuals with their 
place of work has grown, making a much larger population potentially at 
danger for employment consequences of non-employment behavior.  In this 
paper, I provide means of deciding which employees might reasonably be 
thought to be a ‘face’ of a business, and thereby held to higher standards, 
and when such standards are unreasonable, even in a social media 
dominated environment.  
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE, RELATIONAL THEORY AND ALTERNATIVE 
DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Therese MacDermott and Denise Meyerson (Macquarie)
This paper explores what makes legal procedures just in the ADR context, 
which differs from the adjudicative context in that the justice of procedures 
cannot be directly tied to their accuracy in leading to correct legal 
outcomes. One well known view is that ADR procedures are just when 
they make it possible for the parties to reach an informed and voluntary 
agreement. We examine the flaws with this approach, explaining why the 
ideas of consent and autonomy are incapable of doing all the justificatory 
work. Instead, we suggest that ADR processes should be evaluated 
through the lens of relational factors, such as voice, respectful treatment, 
and the perceived trustworthiness and neutrality of third parties involved in 
decision-making processes. We draw on empirical research which shows that 
perceptions of procedural justice are tied to these relational or interpersonal 
aspects of treatment and contend that ADR processes should speak to these 
relational concerns as a matter of justice.
RULES, PERCEPTION AND EMOTION: WHEN DO INSTITUTIONS 
DETERMINE BEHAVIOUR? 
Brendan Markey-Towler (UQ)
This paper seeks to contribute to institutional theory by providing it with 
a stronger basis in cognitive and affective psychology. We organise this 
contribution around the central question of what psychological preconditions 
must exist for institutions to determine behaviour and order our societies. 
We defend the notion that institutional theory may gain from such a 
contribution relative to the major existing currents of institutional thought. 
We then introduce new theory of the mind as a network structure within 
which the psychological process operates as an integrative framework which 
we might use to integrate insights from cognitive and affective psychology 
into institutional theory. We discover that institutions must be expressed as 
rules in mental networks which guide thinking and behaviour, be embedded 
within a cognitive apparatus such that they are called to mind by perception 
to so guide thinking and behaviour, and be anchored to emotion such that 
they are endowed with urgency in order for them to have a hold on individual 
behaviour. From this theory we derive definite predictions, as well as policy 
insights.
PRIVILEGES AND JUSTIFICATIONS
Rob Mullins (UQ)
This paper considers the relationship between privileges and justifications 
in legal doctrine, particularly in private law. A review of the literature on 
legal privileges reveals confusion about how the two concepts relate to 
one another, if they relate at all. In his discussion of the Supreme Court of 
Minnesota’s famous decision in Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Co, for 
instance, John Goldberg  (2015) argues that it is inapt to label the case as 
concerning a ‘privilege’ of private necessity, partly on the ground that the 
necessity in question is functioning as a ‘denial or justification rather than 
an excuse’. I consider the philosophical relationship between privileges and 
justifications in greater generality. I argue that, granted certain plausible 
assumptions, justifications and privileges might logically relate to one another 
in several ways. 
THE RAWLSIAN NOTION OF COLLECTIVE SELF-DETERMINATION: A 
RECONSTRUCTION
Jayani Nadarajalingam (Monash)
Paul Weithman, in his recent work, puts forward a reconstruction of Rawlsian 
political autonomy that, I argue, is incomplete. There are two distinct 
components of political autonomy at work in the Rawlsian notion of ‘full 
autonomy’ which Weithman conflates. In order to identify the conflation, I 
put forward a reconstruction of the second component of Rawlsian political 
autonomy, ‘collective self-determination over time’, that is quite distinct 
from the reconstruction provided by Weithman. My reconstruction will 
bring to light both a new way of understanding the relationship between A 
Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism and, relatedly, an appreciation of 
Rawls’s methodology of political philosophy as broader, in scope, than his 
methodology of political liberalism.
THE RULE OF LAW WITHOUT THE CONCEPT OF LAW 
Hillary Nye (LSE/Alberta)
Debates about the nature of law are often said to have reached an impasse. 
I suggest that this raises a problem for our inquiries about the rule of law. 
Many theories of the rule of law define its demands according to the idea of 
being constrained by law. This understanding of the rule of law is problematic, 
because it requires us to settle the further, fraught, question of what law 
is. I propose a different understanding of the rule of law – one that can be 
understood in purely normative terms, without recourse to notions of law. We 
should understand the rule of law as a ‘thick concept’: a normative concept 
with descriptive content that points us towards the idea of being controlled by 
rules and constrained by our institutional history.
CLARIFYING THE TASK OF LINGUISTIC POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
Lukas Opacic (Sydney)
Contrary to the claims of (the later) Wittgenstein, J L Austin, and others, 
mainstream political philosophers over the last 50 years or so have come to 
see the problems of political philosophy not as the symptoms of an ‘illness’ 
or the products of linguistic confusion, but rather as real and important 
questions about which they as political philosophers can say something 
meaningful. On the other hand, the philosophical hinges upon which these 
philosophers have swung their allegiances towards the mainstream view 
are somewhat more difficult to locate, and this is particularly the case 
in political philosophy. In fact, one of the only conscientious treatments 
of ‘linguistic’ political philosophy in the literature is that of David Miller 
all the way back in 1983. In light of this fact, it is not a stretch to say that 
among mainstream political philosophers the received view is that ordinary 
language philosophy has had its day and can now be, for the most part, 
ignored. This paper sketches an argument that pushes back against this 
view by way of an examination of Miller’s exposition of it. The paper shows 
that in failing to accurately characterise its target, Miller’s argument fails 
to land the required blow to linguistic philosophy. Given the way in which 
Miller’s argument faithfully reflects many of the arguments made by 
mainstream philosophers against linguistic philosophy, the value of the 
argument in this paper is that it shows linguistic philosophy is more robust 
than mainstream philosophers tend to assume. 
ARE ALL HUMAN RIGHTS CONCEPTUALLY THE SAME, OR CAN 
THEY BE DISTINGUISHED?
William Phillips (Melbourne)
Many philosophers now reject the division of human rights into liberty 
rights and welfare rights. Perhaps the most influential argument against 
this division is Henry Shue’s claim that all human rights correlate to three 
kinds of duties – duties to avoid depriving, duties to protect, and duties to 
aid (the Tripartite Duty Thesis). I suggest that there are strong reasons 
for rejecting the Tripartite Duty Thesis. First, it obscures the rights that 
attach to particular duties and their function as second-personal claims. 
Second, I claim that it is hard to see how every human right correlates to 
the same three duties. It makes little sense to say that duties to aid that 
are freestanding and do not depend on the existence of a prior violation of 
duty to avoid depriving attach to the same right as duties to aid that are 
reparative and dependent on the existence of a prior violation of a duty to 
avoid depriving. I claim that each human rights duty is best understood as 
attaching to an individuated human right. I argue that some human rights 
are conceptually distinct from others.
EPISTEMIC PEERS AND EPISTEMIC DISAGREEMENT IN THE 
CONTEXT OF JURISPRUDENCE
Christian Ponce (UNSW)
The question of how judges ought to balance the views of other judges 
sitting in the same court against their own first instincts still remains 
largely underdeveloped. This paper will explore the contributions that 
epistemology might offer in the context of traditional legal interpretation 
such as statutory and constitutional interpretation, particularly when 
disagreements arise about the best legal outcome of complex cases. Thus, 
the theories of conciliationism, solipsism, steadfastness and pluralism will 
guide us towards alternative strategies and answers for addressing the 
challenges that peer disagreements and epistemic peers pose to the legal 
decision-making process.
WHAT IS THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW FOR A NATURALIST? 
Dan Priel (Osgoode Hall)
For several decades now Brian Leiter has called for jurisprudence to be 
naturalized. He has, however, done very little to explain what naturalistic 
jurisprudence would actually look like. His few examples of naturalistic 
jurisprudence, such as political scientists’ ‘attitudinal model’ as an 
explanation of the voting patterns of American judges, are unsatisfactory: 
First, it suggests that ‘naturalistic jurisprudence’ is not a novel development, 
but just a new label for something that has been in existence for a long 
time; and, second, without doubting the significance of this work, it is not 
what most people would consider philosophical. My paper attempts to 
present an alternative: one that both dismisses certain currently popular 
questions (‘the nature of law’) as misguided, but also proposes a positive 
agenda for naturalistic jurisprudence. Specifically, the paper presents 
‘artificial law theory’ as a naturalistic alternative to both natural law theory 
and legal positivism. 
THE ROLE OF RECOGNITION
Nicole Roughan (Auckland)
What is recognition in a rule of recognition? What amounts to recognition 
of law’s claim to authority? In its attempts to explain law’s normativity by 
reference to ideas of validity and/or justification, analytic jurisprudence 
has had surprisingly little to say about the cognitive and normative 
phenomenon of recognition itself. This paper, which maps out a larger 
project on Law and Recognition, argues that recognition is in need of 
fresh attention, to address questions about the separation and interaction 
between recognition of norms and persons; about law’s interruption of 
mutual practices of inter-personal recognition, and about the challenges 
of recognition posed by the plurality of legal systems and the persons 
subject to their claims to authority.  For when there are persons who are 
not recognised or are mis-recognised by law, or who do not recognize law’s 
claim to authority or recognize alternative claims to authority, then the 
role of recognition itself may cease to have the normative effect that legal 
theory has assumed it to have.
LAW AS PROMISES
Angelo Ryu (Michigan)
Laws are promises. We ought to follow promises. This best explains legal 
authority. Laws entail a reliance interest unique to promises. Promissory 
obligations are special obligations. This bounds political obligation. The 
nature of promises delimits the moral nature of law. This account has an 
obvious objection. Promises are discrete. They oblige only the speaker. 
Thus, a problem of determination arises. Who speaks the law? Many point 
to legislators. This paper introduces the ghostwriter problem in response. 
Who authors a ghostwritten autobiography? I argue that we are the 
law’s speaker. Therefore, laws have promissory content that oblige us as 
individuals.
THE INEFFICIENCY GAP – EPISTEMIC LIMITS OF JUDICIAL 
AUTHORITY
Mrinal Singh (Dartmouth)
What is judicial authority? Few cases make it to trial. Judges are limited 
in so-called hard cases. We ought to constrain judicial power accordingly. I 
use formal methods to examine the nature of incommensurable values in 
legal proceedings. Consider a civil trial engaging two dissatisfied groups, 
Group A and Group B. I argue that the law ought to maximize utility. Using 
Edgeworth Boxes from microeconomic theory, I show that judges are 
currently unable to consistently reallocate A and B to a Pareto efficient 
outcome – one where a group cannot be made better off without making 
the other worse off. This indeterminacy causes harmful inefficiency. A 
coherent theory of judicial power must account for this epistemic limitation. 
REASONING WITH AUTHORITATIVE DIRECTIVES
Dale Smith (Melbourne)
When one is subject to a (morally legitimate) authoritative directive, what 
does that directive give one reason to do? One appealingly simple answer is 
that the directive gives you reason to do what the authority told you to do. 
(Perhaps it gives you reason to do other things as well, but it at least gives 
you reason to do that.) If the authority commanded you to č, then you have 
reason to č. Indeed, on one view, this answer follows from the very nature 
of legitimate authority, as involving a moral power to create obligations 
in others by one’s say-so. I shall offer some reasons to reject this simple 
picture of the reason that an authoritative directive provides. I shall then 
sketch, in a very preliminary way, a more complex picture of the reasons 
provided by an authoritative directive.
INTERESTING THINGS TO DO WITH A DEAD GRUNDNORM 
(THROUGH A LEAP WITHOUT FAITH)
Iain Stewart (Macquarie)
The foremost Kelsen-scholar, Stanley L. Paulson, has pronounced the Pure 
Theory of Law seriously unwell, stricken by its creator’s own hand, and 
no longer fit to form a ‘third way’ between fact-based legal positivism and 
natural law theory.  The blow was struck in 1962, when Kelsen confessed 
that the Pure Theory’s keystone, the concept of a basic norm (Grundnorm), 
was self-contradictory; although in 1964 he tried to rescue it with 
Vaihinger’s dubiously extended idea of ‘fiction’.  Paulson contends that, with 
this and parallel moves, Kelsen kicks away the Kantian foundations of his 
‘normative’ legal science. The Pure Theory contains the most developed 
form of the hierarchy conception of law (Stufenbaulehre), centring on 
‘legal validity’ in the public-law sense, which is judicially orthodox and 
I think generally accurate.  I shall attempt to conserve some form of 
hierarchy theory, by tweaking it inside out with the help of a more critical 
counterpart to the concept of a basic norm.  This will not belong to a ‘third 
way’, however, but to a different kind of way.
NATURAL LAW IN REFORMED CHRISTIANITY: HISTORICAL 
DEVELOPMENTS AND CONTEMPORARY CONTRIBUTIONS
David VanDrunen (Westminster Seminary California)
In early modern Europe, Reformed Christian scholars widely embraced the 
idea of natural law, although they did not share a single theory about it. 
Their understanding of natural law shaped both their theology and their 
reflections on political order and resistance to tyrannical government. 
Although natural law fell into disfavor among many prominent Reformed 
thinkers in the twentieth century, it has experienced a renaissance in the 
early twenty-first. In this paper, I discuss these historical developments 
and also reflect on the challenges, prospects, and possible contributions of 
this renewed Reformed natural law thought for contemporary political and 
legal theory.
THE ARGUMENT FROM CONSENT FOR A MORAL OBLIGATION TO 
OBEY THE LAW
Kevin Walton (Sydney)
The argument from consent for a moral obligation to obey the law is 
generally thought to be undermined by the fact that most of those to 
whom the law applies do not consent. I disagree. Yet questions about the 
argument remain. I consider some of them.
POLITICAL CONSTITUTIONALISM: LEGAL FORMS AND LIBERAL 
NORMS
Edward Willis (Auckland)  
This paper takes seriously the idea that political constitutionalism can 
be used as a model for public law analysis. With specific reference to the 
archetypal political constitution of New Zealand, it demonstrates how 
political constitutionalism explains and justifies key aspects of real world 
constitutional practice. However, the analysis also indicates that in practice 
constitutional politics can be sensitive to legal processes and liberal norms 
in ways that are difficult to reconcile with political constitutionalism as 
traditionally understood. The paper therefore challenges the conventional 
characterisation of political constitutionalism as being ‘prescriptive 
without prescribing much’ and suggests the need for a richer account of 
what is constitutional about politics. 
THE VICTORIAN VOLUNTARY ASSISTED DYING ACT 2017: SOME 
QUESTIONS
David Wood (Melbourne)
The paper explores certain features of the Victorian Voluntary Assisted 
Dying Act 2017. It is concerned in particular with the Act’s handling of 
the sequence of events following the completion of the ‘request and 
assessment process.’ The paper examines the concept of a ‘voluntary 
assisted dying permit’ and considers how the role of the ‘contact person’ 
could be developed. It explores how, through expansion of the Act’s 
eligibility criteria, the assisted suicide and voluntary euthanasia regime it 
establishes could serve the social end of suicide prevention.
ECOLOGICAL VULNERABILITY AND THE DEVOLUTION OF 
INDIVIDUAL AUTONOMY
Katie Woolaston (Griffith)
When it comes to wildlife law and management, individualised conceptions 
of autonomy are often directly incompatible with species protection. 
Autonomy is so internalised that stakeholders often rebel against state 
attempts to regulate. Competing personal interests and their link to 
individual autonomy can result in conservation conflicts that become 
‘wicked problems’—unsolvable by traditional means. However, Vulnerability 
Theory considers that individualised conceptions of autonomy are a myth 
that needs to be removed from our institutions. In wildlife management, 
we are already voluntarily giving up some of the more institutionalised 
notions of autonomy. A return to community, place based governance 
has meant that some individuals are more willing to relinquish traditional 
conceptions of autonomy and replace it with a version that gives them a 
voice in decision-making. When the involvement of state fosters a sense of 
place and a sense of community, while allowing for different voices, we can 
simultaneously increase autonomy and reduce our ecological and personal 
vulnerability.
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